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NOTES
NOTICE AND HEARING IN MINIMUM WAGE REGULATION
Recent cases indicate the increasing prominence of the ques-
tion of notice and hearing in administrative rule-making of all
kinds. On the ground of inadequate hearing minimum wage
orders applicable to women and minors employed in industry
were temporarily enjoined in Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Industrial Commission of Minnesota;1 relief was granted pen-
dente lite against a minimum price order for coal in Saxton Coal
Mining Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission;2 and a
minimum price order relating to milk was returned to a milk
commission for reconsideration upon additional evidence in Col-
teryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Commission.3 This new
vigilance of the judiciary is due, in part at least, to the Supreme
Court's decision in Morgan v. United States4 that the hearing
which had preceded an order of the Secretary of Agriculture
fixing maximum rates to be charged by market agencies at the
Kansas City stockyards was fatally defective. 5
What constitutes "adequate notice and hearing" in rule-mak-
ing procedure for constitutional purposes is a difficult question-
difficult because "due process" has never been defined by the
courts, has been exemplified only. Sufficient content has been
given to the concept that three main classes of regulations may
be distinguished. The first class comprises mainly regulations
affecting public health and safety, which "belong to that class
of police regulations to which all individual rights of property
are held subject, whether established directly by enactments of
the legislative power, or by its authority through boards of local
administration." 6 Here, unless there is statutory provision to the
contrary, no advance notice and hearing are necessary because
of the emergency nature of the regulations and the technical
character of the investigations. Examples include regulations to
prevent pollution of water supply,7 to compel vaccination of
1. (D. C. D. Minn. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 370.
2. (App. D. C. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 517.
3. (Pa. 1938) 1 A. (2d) 775.
4. (1938) 304 U. S. 1, (1938) 23 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 564.
5. The Morgan case is responsible also for the recent change in proce-
dure before the Federal Communications Commission by which all proposed
reports or findings of fact and conclusions must be offered to all interested
parties who then have argument thereon as a matter of right. (1938) 6
U. S. L. Week 317.
6. Nelson v. State Board of Health (1904) 186 Mass. 330, 334, 71 N. E.
693. See Black, Legislation and Administration (1935) 2 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 270, 280 ff.
7. Nelson v. State Board of Health (1904) 186 Mass. 330, 71 N. E. 693.
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school children in order to prevent the outbreak of small pox,8
to force landlords to supply tenants with water,9 to protect fish
'by exclusion of sawdust from a river,10 and to control plant dis-
eases. n The second class conists of price-fixing and regulation
of wages to control competition and regulate standards in various
industries. It is generally concerned with commodities such as
milk12 and tobacco,3 with services such as barbering,14 laundry,
and dry-cleaning,'5 and with hours and wages in industry.21 The
necessary amount of advance notice and hearing, absent statu-
tory requirement, varies. In the third class, viz., rate-fixing, due
process plays the largest role. Rate-fixing is the regulation of
prices to be charged by public utilities, and is differentiated from
price-fixing by the features of potential confiscation, large capital
investment, and monopolistic tendencies. The feature of confisca-
tion underlies the decisions of the courts requiring strict notice
and hearing7
The three recent cases in which the question of adequacy of
notice and hearing appeared involve the price fixing class of rule-
making. Two of them throw little light on our inquiry. Colter-
yahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Commission is a case of
pure statutory construction, the court finding that the legislative
intent was that the hearings should be complete; the commission
might make an independent survey, but its conclusions had to be
placed in the administrative record, subject to cross-examination
by all intefested parties.28 The statute, however, passed in 1937,
8. State ex rel. Home v. Beil (1901) 157 Ind. 25, 60 N. E. 672.
9. Health Dep't of N. Y. v. Rector of Trinity Church (1895) 145 N. Y.
32, 39 N. E. 833.
10. Commonwealth v. Sisson (1905) 189 Mass. 247, 75 N. E. 619, 1 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 752.
11. Wallace v. Feehan (1934) 206 Ind. 522, 190 N. E. 438.
12. Nebbia v. New York (1934) 291 U. S. 502; Highland Farms Dairy,
Inc. v. Agnew (D. C. E. D. Va. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 575; Colteryahn Sani-
tary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm. (Pa. 1938) 1 A. (2d) 775. See Note
(1938) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 789.
13. Townsend v. Yeomans (1937) 301 U. S. 441.
14. Board of Barber Examiners v. Parker (La. 1938) 182 So. 485;
Herrin v. Arnold (Okla. 1938) 82 P. (2d) 977.
15. Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board (Fla.
1938) 183 So. 759.
16. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) 300 U. S. 379, overruling
Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) 261 U. S. 525.
17. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota (1890) 134 U. S. 418; Acker
v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 468; Morgan v. United States (1938)
304 U. S. 1; St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States (1936) 298 U. S.
38; Consolidated Water Co. v. Maltbie (Sup. Ct. 1938) 167 Misc. 269, 3
N. Y. S. (2d) 799; Cushman, Due Process of Law in 5 Encyc. Soc. Sci.
(1931).
18. (Pa. 1938) 1 A. (2d) 775, 779, cited supra, note 3.
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itself testifies to the increasing exactions which state legislatures
now deem themselves forced to demand to avoid unexpected con-
stitutional pitfalls.19 The National Bituminous Coal Commission
casef " dealt not with the scope of the hearing required but with
the fact that, by the statute, hearing before the issuance of a
minimum price order was mandatory. A hearing subsequent to
the order was held not to fulfil the requirements.
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Industrial Commission2i di-
rectly presents the question of constitutional requirements. Here
the commission established minimum rates of wages for women
and minors employed in many trades in the state of Minnesota.
It appointed an advisory board of eleven members, five suggested
by the Minnesota Employers' Association, five by the Minnesota
State Federation of Labor, and one elected by these ten, who
after much study made a report and recommendation to the
board. Thereafter the commission held a public hearing, at
which it introduced no evidence and no witnesses and heard
only brief statements from the opposition. It then made the
orders challenged. The court granted an interlocutory injunction,
saying that the commission had either to show that due process
had been accorded in its procedure or that such requirements
were not applicable to it. The court, quoting at length from Ohio
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission 2 and Morgan
v. United States,2 3 said that unless the action of the commission
was "executive or administrative" only (without, however, defin-
ing these terms) and hence did not require "the gathering and
weighing of evidence and the exercise of judgment in determin-
ing important, difficult, and controversial questions of fact," a
"full hearing" must be accorded. 2 The burden was said to rest
upon the commission to show that it "is not such a regulatory
board or administrative agency performing quasi-judicial func-
tions as is subject to the requirements of the due process clause
of the Constitution of the United States, as those requirements
have been stated by the Supreme Court in the cases to which we
have referred. ' 125
The Morgan Case involved an order of the Secretary of Agri-
culture fixing maximum rates to be charged by market agencies
19. (1937) 31 P. S. secs. 700j-801.
20. (App. D. C. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 517, cited supra, note 2.
21. (D. C. D. Minn. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 370.
22. (1937) 301 U. S. 292.
23. (1988) 304 U. S. 1.
24. (D. C. D. Minn. 1938) 29 F. Supp. 370, 377.
25. Ibid.
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for buying and selling livestock at Kansas City stockyards. There
was taking of evidence before an examiner and oral argument
before the Acting Secretary of Agriculture. The Government
suibmitted no brief, formulated no issues, and furnished no state-
ment or summary of its contentions and no proposed findings.
The Bureau of Animal Industry prepared elaborate findings
which the Secretary considered, but these could not be examined
by the respondents until they were served with the order. The
Secretary was not present at the hearings, where "thousands of
pages of testimony were taken by the examiner and numerous
complicated exhibits were introduced bearing upon all phases of
the broad subject of the conduct of the market agencies. '' 20 The
order of the Secretary was held invalid because of an incomplete
hearing, the court declaring broadly that "the right to a hearing
embraces not only the right to present evidence but also a reason-
able opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and
to meet them," and that "those who are brought into contest
with the government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the
control of their activities are entitled to be fairly advised of
what the government proposes and to be heard upon its proposals
before it issues its final command." 27
Both cases illustrate the same judicial approach to procedural
problems.- All governmental functions are divided into legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial, with accompanying classes of quasi-
legislative, administrative, and quasi-judicial functions. New
governmental functions are forced into this stereotyped' classifi-
cation without analysis of their role in meeting actual needs. A
particular function is labeled quasi-legislative, and by analogy to
the power of the legislatures to proceed without notice and hear-
ing29 the conclusion is drawn that notice and hearing are not
necessary before an administrative board performing the func-
tion.3O By -a like technique a function called quasi-judicial is
26. (1938) 304 U. S. 1, 19.
27. Id. at 18-19.
28. See Willis, Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial,
The Conceptual, and The Functional (1935) 1 U. Toronto L. J. 53; Dick-
inson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law (1927) 18-22.
29. Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew (D. C. E. D. Va. 1936) 16
F. Supp. 575; Herrin v. Arnold (Okla. 1938) 82 P. (2d) 977; Townsend v.
Yeomans (1937) 301 U. S. 441.
30. Commonwealth v. Sisson. (1905) 189 Mass. 247, 252, 75 N. E. 619;
Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew (D. C. E. D. Va. 1936) 16 F. Supp.
575; Gillioz v. Webb (C. C. A. 5, 1938) 6 U. S. L. Week 457; Black, Is the
Test of the Reasonableness of an Administrative Determination Subjective
or Objective? (1935) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 601, 608.
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burdened with strict requirements.31 A clearer analysis is that
which describes the exercise of administrative functions under
the heads of rule-making and orders of specific application. Rule-
making may be characterized as the "issuance of regulations or
the making of determinations which are addressed to indicated
but unnamed and unspecified persons or situations"; it is useful
to distinguish it "from issuance of orders or findings or the tak-
ing of action applying to named or specific persons or situa-
tions.' 2 The content of procedural due process should be made
to depend, not on whether the particular exercise of power in-
volved is analogous to legislative action, but on such matters as
the character of the parties affected, the nature of the problems
to be dealt with, the character of the administrative determina-
tion, and the type of administrative agency exercising the func-
tion.33
Realistically it is necessary to estimate the practical problems
of the functioning of a minimum wage board as a rule-making
agency in order to determine the requirements of due process.
The nature of these problems to be investigated depends on the
type of statute involved. In general, there are three types of
minimum wage acts. The first is that exemplified by the Minne-
sota statute involved in the Western Union Telegraph case,34 re-
quiring a "living wage" for all women and minors in industry,
i. e., in the words of the statute, "wages sufficient to maintain
the worker in health and supply him with the necessary comforts
and conditions of reasonable life."35 Another is drafted with
reference to the "fair wage" standard, based not only upon the
worker's living conditions, but also taking into account the value
of the service or class of services rendered.36 In the third, the
wage is based upon what the "traffic can bear," meaning the abil-
ity of industry to pay. 7
To discover a "living wage" the problems of the regulatory
31. Morgan v. United States (1938) 304 U. S. 1; McKee v. Board of
Elections (Tenn. 1938) 116 S. W. (2d) 1033; Buhler v. Dep't of Agricul-
ture & Markets (Wis. 1938) 280 N. W. 367; Dairy Distributors v. Dep't
of Agriculture & Markets (Wis. 1938) 280 N. W. 400.
32. Fuchs, Some Problems of Administrative Rule-Making (1938) 52
Harv. L. Rev. 259, 264.
38. Id. at 266-273.
34. (D. C. D. Minn. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 370, cited supra, note 1.
35. Minn. Mason's Stat. (1927) c. 23, sec. 4232. This is the type of
statute most commonly employed among American jurisdictions.
36. N. Y. Supp. to Gen. Stat. (1931. 1933, 1935) c. 131a, sec. 910c.
37. R. I. Laws of 1936, c. 2289. This standard was prescribed in the
early laws of South Australia and Victoria but is now nowhere the sole
,criterion. Burns, Minimum Wage in 10 Encyc. Soc. Sci. (1933) 491, 493.
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board center on economic questions such as changing price levels,,
appropriate indices, family size, et cetera. Establishing a "fair
wage," on the other hand, involves consideration of factors which
stress conditions other than the welfare of employees. According
to the statutes themselves it involves, first, all relevant circum-
stances affecting the value of the services rendered; second, such
considerations as would guide a court in a suit for the reasonable
value of services not performed under contract; and third, the.
amount of wages paid by employers voluntarily maintaining
minimum fair wage standards for work of like or comparable
character.38 Practically, when there is declining demand for cer-
tain types of skilled labor or a rise in wages of the unskilled,
this has come to mean the wage that will insure the desired sup-
ply of any particular kind of labor. 9 The third type of statute.
requires even more thorough analysis of industrial economic
problems: if a general wage is to be set, the board must investi-
gate the general level of productivity in industry as a whole; if
it concerns the wage in a particular industry, the board must
discover adequate measuring sticks of the industry's "ability to-
pay." All of this indicates that the character of the administra-
tive determination in wage fixing ranges from the simple finding
of facts, such as the actual wages paid in certain industries and
the prices of butter and eggs, to a difficult evaluation of contro-
versies regarding the general economic effects of wage regula-
tion.
Another factor that is prominent in the problem facing a mini-
mum wage board is whether its order affects all industries or
only one industry. From an investigational standpoint, this ques-
tion is not as important when the statute involves solely a "liv-
ing wage" as when it deals with the other two standards. o From
the standpoint of due process this fact is important.
The conventional content of due process in problems as com-
plicated as these becomes well-nigh meaningless. The concept;
evolved as a protection first to real persons, then to fictional per-
sons; in the beginning it was the guardian of life and liberty,
now much oftener the guardian of property. When the inquiry'
only indirectly threatens the owner's stake in enterprises, as in
the prescription of living wages, it is difficult to see why admin-
istrative action should be subject to procedural requirements be-
fore promulgation of orders. When a single industry, however,
38. Supra, note 36.
39. Burns, supra, note 37, at 494.
40. This because of the many interests in the various industries whih
must be balanced in the application of the latter criteria.
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is being investigated for the purposes of the second and third
types of rule-making, it is much more likely that a hearing could
be both useful and protective. A factor that should be kept in-
mind in procedures as flexible as these is the type of administra-
tive board exercising particular functions: a non-expert board
has less justification for refusing a hearing; so also has a board-
that is not made up of representatives of both employers and
employees. 41
Minimum wage making has elements in common with milk-
price fixing. The latter involves also an investigation into a com-
plicated field of business, where the rights of numerous persons-
consumers, producers, and middlemen-must be considered, and-
the factors of public health and interest pitted against the bene-
fits to each of these groups. The amount of notice and hearing"
in this field has been before the courts relatively often. Two,
cases closely in point were decided before Morgan v. United
States. The first, Baldwin v. Dellwood42 involved the validity of
price-fixing orders of the Milk Control Board of New York. The-
statute provided for reasonable notice to all parties concerned.
and to the public and for a hearing in advance of the order. The
court held that the board in making its order could consider its;
own investigations as well as facts brought out in the hearing.
The case implies that the results of independent investigations
need not be divulged before the orders are made.43 State ex rel.
State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co.0 4 allowed still
more latitude. The court found that the board in supervising-
and regulating the milk industry, including the production, im--
portation, transportation, manufacturing, storage, distribution,
delivery, and sale of milk and milk products, was exercising an
administrative function in that it merely effectuated the will of
the legislative body. Neither notice nor hearing was deemed
necessary.45 In Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew', 6 decided
after Morgan v. United States, a state milk commission which
was authorized to fix prices to producers after public hearing-
and investigation was held justified in basing its order on evi-
41. See Fuchs, Some Problems of Administrative Rule-Making (1938)
52 Harv. L. Rev. 270, 271.
42. (Sup. Ct. 1934) 15 Misc. 762, 270 N. Y. S. 418.
43. The board's order, however, was reversed on the ground of lack of'
equal protection of the laws.
44. (1935) 118 N. J. Eq. 504, 179 AtL 116.
45. It was held that due process was satisfied on judicial review of the
administrative proceeding, giving relief from any arbitrary or unreason-
able regulation; or if rate-making, by inquiry into confiscation.
46. (D. C. E. D. Va. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 575.
1939] NOTES
Washington University Open Scholarship
240 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24
dence other than that presented at the hearing. The opinion dis-
tinguished the Morgan Case by saying that the proceeding there
-had "special attributes" and that the Secretary was required to
make his determinations in accordance with the procedural re-
quirements of the statute, including full hearing and evidence
adequate to support necessary finding of fact. It was held that
the packers and stockyards cases had no application to the hear-
ing required by the milk control act.
That there is a difference in the essential nature of a proceed-
ing to fix stockyard agencies' prices and one fixing minimum
milk prices or minimum wages, there can be little doubt. The
-former proceeding, in the first place, involves only one industry,
huge though it be. A wage proceeding may do the same; but in
that case, a second, more important difference arises, which is
that the requisite statistics and factors upon which the wage is
set or the milk price determined do not emerge from the one
source, the industry. Instead, as has been noted, the wage survey
includes economic theories and social statistics as well. Third,
the crux of the problem of the wage or milk commission lies in
the balancing of innumerable interests, human as well as eco-
nomic; while the question of reasonable financial return to the
live stock brokers after subtracting reasonable costs is the prime
,determining factor in the other investigation. Next, the problem
involved in the stockyards cases is that of setting maximum
charges for services, while the milk and wage cases set minimum
-prices; the first being an outgrowth of the control of monopoly,
the second of control of competition. The pragmatic difference
-which this makes is that, where maximum charges are prescribed,
since costs remain relatively fixed, it is not possible for the
-market agencies to shift their losses; milk-dealers, however, com-
pelled to pay minimum prices to farmers, can raise their retail
prices within limits just as employers can largely recoup in-
creased selling prices, subject to the restrictions imposed by ef-
fective demand. Conversely, farmers and workers, dissatisfied
with prescribed minima, can seek to exact more. A last and most
important difference between the two lies in the fact that mini-
mum wage making is still largely in the experimental stage,
where its effects are not yet fully understood and its benefits may
or may not turn out to be an economic blessing. Business as well
as labor may have to suffer a little until fair adjustment is
brought about.
That these functional differences in types of administrative
action exist and have an influence on the type of proceedings
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss2/12
necessary has been recognized by the Supreme Court itself. In
1936, in Acker v. United States, 7 a bill to enjoin a maximum
rate order for Chicago market agencies under the Packers and
Stock Yards Act of 1921 was dismissed. Supreme Court indorse-
ment of the trial court's refusal to hold that a judicial trial de
novo on the question of confiscation was necessary was based
upon the view that the issue was not confiscation but the reason-
ableness of a charge for personal service, and that there had been
adequate notice and a full hearing.
Furthermore, cases decided after the Morgan Case by the Su-
preme Court indicate that the language of that case is not to be
construed too literally. 8 National Labor Relations Board v.
Mackay" states that "the Fifth Amendment guarantees no par-
ticular form of procedure; it protects substantial rights."50 The
real question as regards the need for interim findings is stated
to be whether the issues and contentions of the parties were
clearly defined at some stage of the proceeding; it was held that
here they were, and "as no other detriment or disadvantage is
claimed to have ensued from the Board's procedure, the matter
is not one calling for a reversal of the order."51 The recent case
of Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board52
is of like import: while "it would have been better practice for
the Board to have directed the examiner to make a tentative re-
port with an opportunity for exceptions and argument thereon,"
there was no basis for concluding that the issues and contentions.
were not clearly defined and that the petitioning companies were
not fully advised of them.58 The same notion is expressed in
American Toll Bridge Co. v. Railroad Commission.- After hold-
ing that the findings of fact were stated with sufficient fullness
to apprise the parties and the court of all the facts supporting
the commission's decision, the court said:
Opportunity to examine and object to proposed findings
before the decision was rendered was not essential. The
number and complexity of findings, and a lack of opportu-
nity to examine, which in the Morgan Case evoked criticism,
were not here present.55
47. 298 U. S. 426.
48. Comment (1938) 23 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 564.
49. (1938) 304 U. S. 388.
50. Id. at 351.
51. Ibid.
52. (1938) 83 S. Ct. 131.
X3. Id. at 140.
54. (Cal. 1938) 83 P. (2d) 1.
55. Id. at 12.
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There is no substantial reason why the requirements of the
Morgan Case should be applied strictly to the procedure of such
boards as minimum wage commissions. They are not required
,of boards performing analogous functions nor by considerations
of expediency. Courts are likely to forget that there are other
means of controlling the administrative rule-making necessary
to our complex civilization. These include legislative power to
appoint the boards and define their policies and standards; a
capable and expert personnel; and a well-informed and articulate
-public opinion. Intertwined in today's multifarious processes are
far-reaching social problems which can be solved only by trained
workers. And "'Courts,' as Mr. Justice Stone has reminded us,
'are not the only agency of government that must be assumed to
have capacity to govern'; nor are they the only agency moved
by the desire for justice."56  CHARLoTr ANscnurz.
UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION IN MISSOURI
I
Tax legislation, because of its immediate and vital effect upon
such great numbers of persons and properties, has been the
source of endless controversy. A tax provision that is constantly
-being litigated and which has resulted in many far-reaching and
important decisions is Section 3, Article X, of the Missouri Con-
stitution, which provides that
They [taxes] shall be uniform upon the same class of
subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levy-
ing the tax, and all taxes shall be levied and collected by
general laws.
The interpretation- of Section 3 has resulted in certain rules
-and restrictions which many believe to be socially and economi-
cally unsound and impractical as well as inconsistent with the
true intent of the drafters of its terms. In order clearly to under-
stand these rules and restrictions, as well as the conclusions that
have been urged upon but rejected by the courts, some reference
must be made to the law relating to this subject prior to enact-
ment of the section.'
Since 1820 the following important provision, now Section 4,
Article X, has been a part of the Constitution. 2
56. Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) 154.
1. In 1875. R. S. Mo. (1929) 134.
2. See Glasgow v. Rowse (1865) 43 Mo. 479; Hamilton v. St. Louis
,County Court (1851) 15 Mo. 3.
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